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ABSTRACT 
The loss of territoriality over lands conveyed under the Alaska Native Claims 
Settlement Act had adverse impacts for Alaskan tribal governance. Despite 
policy frameworks that emphasize the value of local governance at an 
international, regional, and statewide level, Alaskan tribes face unique 
obstacles to exercising their authority, with consequences for both human 
development and human rights. This Article examines how territoriality was 
lost and analyzes the four major effects of this loss on tribal governance. It 
then describes two distinct but complimentary strategies to rebuilding tribal 
governance authority that rely on both territorial and non-territorial 
authority. 
INTRODUCTION 
Land sovereignty is vital to the ability of Alaskan tribal 
governments to exercise local control. This Article examines how 
Alaskan tribes lost authority over traditional lands—their territorial 
reach—and the impacts of this loss on their ability to protect community 
wellbeing. This Article concludes that, despite the creative ways 
governments overcome the loss of territoriality, re-establishing land 
sovereignty is critical to local self-governance. 
Governments exercise authority over place and people. While these 
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two aspects of sovereignty—place and people—are often thought of as 
inextricably bound together,1 the two do not always co-exist. The Alaska 
Native Claims Settlement Act of 1971 (ANCSA)2 broke apart tribal 
sovereign authority into clearly delineated components: land and 
membership.3 Defined as “sovereigns without territorial reach,” Alaskan 
tribes experience unique challenges to their exercise of local 
governance.4 Part I of this paper frames the issue regionally, describing 
the evolution of “fate control” as a principle of Arctic human 
development supporting strong local governance. Part II focuses on 
Alaska specifically, identifying how Alaska’s principles of local 
governance differ from its practice. Part III examines the loss of 
territorial governance and its impact on tribal governments’ capacity to 
address issues of community wellbeing. Part IV describes two of the 
many ways Alaskan tribes are seeking increased governance authority: 
designating more land as Indian Country and using science and 
traditional knowledge. In particular, Part IV highlights the work of the 
Yukon River Inter-Tribal Watershed Council—an international treaty-
based organization of Alaskan tribes and Canadian First Nations intent 
on weaving together seemingly disparate strands of science, law, and 
policy into a single path towards self-determination. 
Finally, this Article concludes that the value of local control and 
governance is recognized in principle but not in practice throughout all 
levels of governance. To live up to these ideals, Alaska must create and 
adopt policies that better support local government. 
I. FATE CONTROL AS A PRINCIPLE OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 
IN THE ARCTIC 
The concept of “fate control” is viewed as one of the key 
determinants of wellbeing in Arctic communities.5 The Arctic Social 
 
 1. See Frederico Lenzerini, Sovereignty Revisited: International Law and 
Parallel Sovereignty of Indigenous Peoples, 42 TEX. INT’L L.J. 155, 160 (2006) 
(discussing sovereignty as power over a territory and a community of people). 
 2. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601–29h (2012). 
 3. Id. 
 4. Alaska ex rel. Yukon Flats Sch. Dist. v. Venetie Tribal Gov’t, 101 F.3d 
1286, 1303 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 5. NORDIC COUNCIL OF MINISTERS, ARCTIC SOCIAL INDICATORS 16 (Joan N. 
Larson et al. eds., 2010) [hereinafter ASI I]. Fate control is similar to the human 
right of self-determination found in a variety of international legal instruments. 
Cf. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 61/295, 4, U.N. 
GAOR, 61st Sess., Supp. No. 53, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/295, at 4 (Sept. 13, 2007); 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 21 
U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316, at 52 (1966), 999 
U.N.T.S. 171, entered into force, Mar. 23, 1976; U.N. International Covenant on 
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Indicators report of 2010 defines “fate control” as the ability of 
communities and individuals to “control their own destiny, whether 
political, economic or along other axes.”6 “Those [who] feel[] 
empowered to control their fate,” the report justifies, “are more likely to 
take actions needed to better their situation.”7 Since 2004, an emphasis 
on fate control as part of a larger human development framework has 
allowed northern governments to assess and support the capacity of 
their communities to respond to increased global political and economic 
attention to the region. 
The focus on human development as a policy framework in the 
United States dates back to the 1990s.8 Human development proponents 
argue that the goal of development projects should be to “enlarge 
people’s choices”9 by addressing the lack of education, poor health care, 
inequalities in economic, social, and political rights, and other factors 
that hinder human progress.10 Instead of focusing on the expansion of 
“only one choice—income,” human development proponents suggest 
enlarging “all human choices—whether economic, social, cultural, or 
political.”11 Measuring human progress, then, becomes a study of 
literacy, longevity, and GDP per capita rates together, as opposed to 
income alone.12 The human development paradigm has received 
widespread support.13 In particular, the United Nations published the 
first annual Human Development Report in 1990 and has relied on the 
human development paradigm ever since.14 
 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR, 
21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), at 49; 993 U.N.T.S. 3, entered 
into force, Jan. 3, 1976. One of the differences between the two is that self-
determination is a human right (and therefore enforceable) whereas “fate 
control” is a way to measure progress or well-being within a human 
development rubric (and therefore aspirational). 
 6. ASI I, supra note 5, at 16–17. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Mahbub ul Haq, The Human Development Paradigm, in READINGS IN 
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 17, 22 (Sakiko Fukuda-Parr & A.K. Shiva Kumar eds., 
2003). 
 9. Id. at 17. 
 10. See Amartya Sen, Foreword to READINGS IN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT, supra 
note 8, at vii, vii (discussing various hindrances that frustrate human potential). 
 11. ul Haq, supra note 8, at 17. 
 12. ul Haq, The Birth of the Human Development Index, in READINGS IN HUMAN 
DEVELOPMENT, supra note 8, at 103, 103. 
 13. See, e.g., UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, U.N. HUMAN 
DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1990: CONCEPTS AND MEASURES OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 1 
(1990) (publishing the first annual Human Development Report in 1990). 
 14. See, e.g., UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, U.N. HUMAN 
DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2014: SUSTAINING HUMAN PROGRESS: REDUCING 
VULNERABILITIES AND BUILDING RESILIENCE 1 (2014) (publishing the most recent 
annual Human Development Report in 2014). 
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The concept of human development resonates strongly throughout 
the Arctic. The concern for “the richness of human life, rather than the 
richness of the economies in which human beings live”15 is profoundly 
felt by indigenous communities.16 Human development frameworks are 
particularly relevant as most communities in the Arctic, though located 
in fairly wealthy nation-states, remain economically troubled.17 
Consequently, in 2002 the Arctic Council—an international 
governmental organization comprised of eight member nation-states 
and six “permanent participants,”18—called for the drafting of a Human 
Development Report (AHDR) for the Arctic.19 Released in 2004, the 
AHDR acknowledged that even within a human development 
framework, the unique attributes of life in the Arctic and the historic 
context of Arctic indigenous peoples call for special attention.20 The 
AHDR suggested three factors to consider with regards to human 
development in the Arctic: (1) the ability of communities to control their 
own fate, (2) the ability of communities to promote their cultural 
viability, and (3) the ability of communities to continue to rely on the 
natural environment to sustain themselves.21 
In terms of Arctic governance, the AHDR identified the importance 
of property rights and the allocation of power to local governments as 
 
 15. About Human Development, UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/humandev (last visited Sept. 20, 2014) (quoting 
Amartya Sen). 
 16. See Arthur Manuel & Nicole Schabus, Indigenous Peoples at the Margin of 
the Global Economy: A Violation of International Human Rights and International 
Trade Law, 8 CHAP. L. REV. 229, 230–31 (2005) (comparing the rank of indigenous 
peoples in Canada on the Human Development Index to that of the rest of 
Canada). 
 17. See id. (discussing Canada’s high ranking on the Human Development 
Index and the much lower levels of development in indigenous communities). 
 18. “Permanent Participants” are organizations representing Arctic 
Indigenous peoples and provide for their participation in activities of the Arctic 
Council. These participants include the Aleut International Association, the 
Arctic Athabascan Council, the Gwich’in Council International, the Inuit 
Circumpolar Conference, the Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the 
North, and the Saami Council. Permanent Participants, ARCTIC-COUNCIL, 
http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-us/permanent-
participants (last visited Oct. 2, 2014). 
 19. ASI I, supra note 5, at 7. 
 20. See ORAN R. YOUNG & NIELS EINARSSON, ARCTIC HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 
REPORT 16–17 (Stefansson Arctic Inst. ed., 2004) (discussing unique aspects of life 
in the Arctic and the limitations of the Human Development Index). 
 21. See ASI I, supra note 5, at 12 (discussing the Arctic Human Development 
Report’s identification of these three factors of well-being as important in 
defining well-being in the Arctic); JACK KRUSE ET AL., SLICA RESULTS 123 (2007) 
(concluding that well-being in Arctic communities is closely related to job 
opportunities, locally available fish and game, and a sense of local control). 
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two critical components necessary to ensure the sustainability of culture 
and environment in the Arctic.22 The AHDR recommended “systematic 
studies and analysis of the full range of property-rights systems as they 
are applied in the Arctic . . . [,] look[ing] critically both at the 
privatization approaches . . . in North America and of alternative 
systems.”23 It found that the lack of local governance directly affects 
human health in the Arctic.24 In areas with effective local self-
government, for example, mental health has improved and suicide rates 
have fallen.25 
Since the AHDR in 2004, there have been efforts to operationalize 
its recommendations. The Arctic Social Indicators (ASI) project follows 
up on the work of the AHDR and seeks to devise indicators to monitor 
human development in the region.26 The ASI project led to the issuance 
of two reports: ASI I in 2010, which identified a series of measurable 
indicators to chart progress in wellbeing and human development,27 and 
ASI II in 2014, which analyzed a series of case studies from different 
parts of the Arctic.28 As of this writing, a second report from the United 
Nations on Arctic Human Development is expected in the second half of 
2014.29 
With fate control ensconced as a marker of progress for northern 
communities, such communities have focused on how best to ensure 
their ability to govern. This question is especially complicated in Alaska, 
where the ability of small communities to govern is hampered by the 
loss of territorial governance.30 
 
 22. RICHARD A. CAULFIELD, ARCTIC HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 121 
(Stefansson Arctic Inst. ed., 2004). 
 23. Id. at 135. 
 24. CARL M. HILD & VIGDIS STORDAHL, ARCTIC HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 
159 (Stefansson Arctic Inst. ed., 2004). 
 25. Id. 
 26. ASI I, supra note 5, at 12. 
  27. Id. 
 28. NORDIC COUNCIL OF MINISTERS, ARCTIC SOCIAL INDICATORS II 53–93 (Joan 
N. Larson et al. eds., 2014) [hereinafter ASI II]. 
 29. Arctic Human Development Report, Stefansson Arctic Institute, 
http://www.svs.is/en/ahdr-ii-en (last visited Oct. 2, 2014). 
 30. See Geoffrey D. Strommer & Stephen D. Osborne, “Indian Country” and 
the Nature and Scope of Tribal Self-Government in Alaska, 22 ALASKA L. REV. 1, 1 
(2005) (discussing the challenges Alaska Natives face with regards to tribal 
sovereignty). This remains true even though principles of local government are 
enshrined in the Alaska Constitution. See ALASKA CONST. art. X, § 1 (“The 
purpose of this article is to provide for maximum local self-government with a 
minimum of local government units, and to prevent duplication of tax-levying 
jurisdictions. A liberal construction shall be given to the powers of local 
government units.”). 
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II. ALASKA AND “LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT” 
A. Principles of Local Control 
Three different sovereigns exist and exercise authority in Alaska: 
the federal government, the state government, and tribal governments. 
As described below, the federal government exercises authority over 
approximately two-thirds of the state’s lands and resources; the state 
government has jurisdiction over approximately one-quarter of the 
lands and resources; and tribal governments lack sovereignty over either 
the lands or resources that have been transferred under the Alaska 
Native Claims Settlement Act. This distribution creates a disparity of 
control among the three sovereign entities, disrupting tribal 
communities’ efforts of local governance. 
Three pieces of federal legislation carved Alaska into three different 
forms of common ownership. First, the Alaska Statehood Act of 1959 
ceded the title to twenty-five percent of lands within the Alaskan 
territory to the new state.31 The Alaska Constitution requires that these 
lands be managed for the equal benefit of all Alaskans, giving rise to the 
idea that Alaska is an “owner” state.32 Second, the Alaska Native Claims 
Settlement Act of 1971 (ANCSA) ceded title of almost twelve percent of 
Alaska’s lands to the Alaska Native Corporations (ANCs) created under 
the Act and chartered under state law.33 Third, though many of the 
federal conservation units founded within Alaska were created prior to 
its statehood, the Alaska National Lands Conservation Act of 1980 
(ANLCA) cemented land statuses within the state.34 Under ANLCA and 
other laws, the federal government owns and manages approximately 
sixty-one percent of the land within the state’s borders, mostly in some 
form of conservation unit.35 Taken together, ninety-nine percent of 
Alaska’s lands are owned either by the federal government, the state 
government, or ANC shareholders. 
On the state side, Alaska’s constitution emphasizes the need to seat 
governments close to the people.36 Structuring the state’s political 
 
 31. Alaska Statehood Act, Pub. L. No. 85-508, § 4, 72 Stat. 339, 339 (1958). 
 32. See ALASKA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 (“It is the policy of the State to encourage 
the settlement of its land and the development of its resources by making them 
available for maximum use consistent with the public interest.”). 
 33. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601–29h (2012). 
 34. 16 U.S.C. §§ 3101–233 (2012). 
 35. Resource Review: Who Owns Alaska?, RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL FOR 
ALASKA, INC. 2, http://www.akrdc.org/newsletters/2009/whoownsalaska.pdf 
(last visited Oct. 2, 2014). 
 36. See ALASKA CONST. art. X, § 1 (stating that the state should have a 
maximum of local self-government with a minimum of local government units). 
ARTICLE - KIMMEL (DO NOT DELETE) 1/26/2015  6:45 PM 
2014 FATE CONTROL AND HUMAN RIGHTS 185 
organization to “provide for maximum local self-government with a 
minimum of local government units,” the constitution attempts to 
balance the need for local control with the goal of minimizing layers of 
bureaucracies.37 The state’s founders envisioned a system of nested local 
governments to ensure local needs were met and sufficient resources 
would be available to meet those needs.38 When Alaskans sought 
statehood in 1958, they did so in large part to get away from the control 
of corporate interests and the federal government.39 The constitution’s 
call for “maximum local self-government and minimum local 
governmental units” attempts to ensure a system of government 
responsive to local needs.40 As a result, Alaska adopted a system of 
“home rule” local governments.41 “Home rule” was also to be the means 
for promoting local government adaptation in a state with great 
variations in geographic, economic, social, and political conditions.42 
Alaska state law creates two general types of municipal 
governments: cities and boroughs.43 Both have the power to tax and 
regulate, although the scope of each authority differs according to the 
specific classification of the governmental organization.44 The sixteen 
organized boroughs cover roughly forty-three percent of Alaska’s 
geography, with the remaining fifty-seven percent comprised of a single, 
unorganized borough as required under state law.45 The Alaska state 
legislature serves as the governing body for the unorganized borough.46 
Within the unorganized borough, there is an additional governance 
structure—the regional educational attendance area (REAA).47 REAAs 
are service areas created to provide public education throughout the 
unorganized borough (except within some types of cities).48 
 
 37. See GERALD MCBEATH & THOMAS MOREHOUSE, ALASKA POLITICS AND 
GOVERNMENT 256–59 (Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1994) (discussing 
the goals of the framers of the Alaska Constitution for local government). 
 38. Id. 
 39. DAVID GETCHES, North Slope Borough, Oil, and the Future of Local 
Government in Alaska, 3 UCLA ALASKA L. REV. 55, 56 (1973–74). 
 40. ALASKA. CONST. art. X, § 1, cl. 1. 
 41. Local Government in Alaska, ALASKA DEP’T OF CMTY. AND ECON. DEV. § 2 
(March 2004) http://commerce.alaska.gov/dnn/Portals/4/pub/Local 
GovernmentinAlaska032004.pdf. 
 42. MCBEATH & MOREHOUSE, supra note 37, at 3. 
 43. ALASKA STAT. §§ 29.04.010–29.04.060 (2012). 
 44. Id. 
 45. Unorganized Areas of Alaska that Meet Borough Incorporation Standards, 
ALASKA LOCAL BOUNDARY COMMISSION TO THE ALASKA LEGISLATURE 29 (Feb. 
2003), http://www.commerce.state.ak.us/dcra/lbc/pubs/Ch1.pdf. 
 46. ALASKA. CONST. art. X, § 6, cl. 1; ALASKA STAT. § 29.03.010. 
 47. ALASKA STAT. § 14.08.031. 
 48. Id. 
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Likewise, the Alaska Constitution embodies the ideal of an “owner 
state,” a term employed by former Alaska Governor Walter Hickel to 
express the idea that Alaska’s lands and resources should be used to the 
benefit of all Alaskans.49 “[The] constitution recognized that the state 
would sometimes have to choose who would get to use scarce 
resources,” Hickel said, “but it also prohibited special privileges or 
exclusive rights to what is commonly owned.”50 The constitution 
established systems to govern resource management, ensure local 
control over the resources upon which local communities directly 
depend, and share authority for the health of Alaska’s common 
resources between multiple layers of government.51 Collective control 
over resources is further embodied in the Declaration of Rights in the 
Alaska Constitution: “all persons have corresponding obligations to the 
people and to the State.”52 In short, state policies reflect and reinforce 
Alaska’s commitment to local governance. 
B. Practices of Local Governance 
Alaska’s policies of local self-government, however, stand in stark 
contrast to the lack of authority given to tribal governments. Professors 
Morehouse and McBeath have noted that, while the urban system of 
governance is relatively simple, the corresponding rural system is very 
complex.53 This “complex nonsystem”54 of governance in the rural areas 
of Alaska creates tremendous obstacles for tribal governments when 
measured against similarly situated local governments in urban Alaska. 
The impacts of this disparity are magnified by the unwillingness of the 
State of Alaska to work with tribal governments. On multiple occasions, 
for example, the state has litigated against Alaska Native tribes to 
prevent their exercise of certain aspects of local self-government.55 
 
 49. Interview by Charles Wilkinson & Patty Limerick with Walter J. Hickel, 
Former Secretary of the Interior, in Boulder, Colo. (Oct. 15, 2003), at 12, available 
at http://centerwest.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/01/hickel.pdf. 
 50. WALTER J. HICKEL, CRISIS IN THE COMMONS: THE ALASKA SOLUTION 78 
(2002). 
 51. See ALASKA CONST. art. X (stating how resources will be governed). 
 52. ALASKA. CONST. art. I, § 1, cl. 3. 
 53. MCBEATH & MOREHOUSE, supra note 37, at 282. 
  54. DAVID CASE & DAVID VOLUCK, ALASKA NATIVES AND AMERICAN LAWS 325 
(3d ed., 2012). 
 55. See, e.g., Simmonds v. Parks, 329 P.3d 995 (Alaska 2014) (holding that 
tribal sovereignty extended to member children, against state objections in the 
trial court); Alaska v. Native Vill. of Venetie Tribal Gov’t, 522 U.S. 520 (1998) 
(holding that ANCSA extinguished Indian country); John v. Baker, 982 P.2d 738 
(Alaska 1999) (holding that tribal court and state court exercised concurrent 
jurisdiction over child custody disputes between tribal members). 
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Exactly how far the scope of tribal sovereignty in Alaska extended 
remained unsettled until almost thirty years after the passage of the 
ANCSA in 1971.56 Unlike other land settlements with aboriginal tribes,57 
ANCSA did not reserve any governance rights in traditional lands to the 
tribes who had existed on these lands for millennia.58 It was not until 
1998, when the United States Supreme Court faced the issue of whether 
tribes could exercise their governance authority to regulate and tax 
ANCSA lands, that the contours of tribal jurisdiction became more 
clearly known. In Alaska v. Village of Venetie Tribal Government,59 the 
Court determined that because ANCSA conveyed lands to “state-
chartered and state-regulated private business corporations,” these 
lands were not “Indian Country” capable of supporting tribal 
governance.60 The Court held that ANCSA severed tribal territorial 
jurisdiction over ANCSA lands, leaving “[tribes] as sovereign entities for 
some purposes, but as sovereigns without territorial reach.”61 The result 
is that ANCSA lands are beyond the reach of tribal control, and remain 
within the exclusive purview of the state to regulate and tax.62 
The Court held that ANCSA preempted any claim to tribal 
governance authority over lands conveyed under the Act.63 Alaska tribes 
no longer have the right to regulate, tax, or otherwise engage in 
management of fish and game resources on any lands conveyed under 
ANCSA. Instead, the authority to govern and manage these lands lies 
with the state. Without this authority, the ties between the tribes and the 
lands conveyed under ANCSA were severed. 
In John v. Baker,64 the Alaska supreme court found that under 
Venetie the “[t]he key inquiry . . . is not whether the tribe is located in 
Indian country, but rather whether the tribe needs jurisdiction over a 
given context to secure tribal self-governance.”65 In holding that tribes 
“have power to make their own substantive law in internal matters,” the 
court stated that tribal courts may also have jurisdiction to “resolve civil 
disputes involving non-members, including non-Indians” when the civil 
actions involve matters essential to self-governance and are “vital to the 
 
 56. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601–29h (2012). 
 57. See John Briscoe, The Aboriginal Land Title of the Native People of Guam, 26 
U. HAW. L. REV. 1, 2 (2003) (“It has long been settled that the native peoples of 
the contiguous 48 states enjoy aboriginal title.”). 
 58. CASE & VOLUCK, supra note 54, at 390. 
 59. 522 U.S. 520 (1998). 
 60. Id. at 534. 
 61. Id. at 526. 
 62. Id. at 530–31. 
 63. Id. 
  64. 982 P.2d 738 (Alaska 1999). 
 65. Id. at 756. 
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maintenance of tribal integrity and self-determination.”66 That decision 
notwithstanding, the state government continues to fight the “228 
landless Alaska tribes” whenever these tribes attempt to assert 
jurisdiction over matters involving domestic relations.67 
III. THE IMPACT OF VENETIE AND THE LOSS OF TERRITORIAL 
GOVERNANCE 
In Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Government,68 the 
Supreme Court held that lands conveyed under ANCSA are outside the 
definition of “Indian Country” and cannot be the basis for sustaining 
territorial sovereignty.69 This applies even when a tribal government 
owns the lands—as was the case in Venetie, where the village 
corporation transferred lands to the tribal government.70 As a result of 
losing territoriality, Alaskan tribes lack critical governance tools to 
address persistent social problems such as poverty, unemployment, and 
continued social exclusion. The loss of territoriality is unique to Alaskan 
tribes and stands in stark contrast to the range of governance authorities 
enjoyed by the other local governments71 and the reservation-based 
Indian tribes throughout the lower 48 states.72 
This Part describes four specific consequences of the loss of 
 
 66. Id. 
 67. See Simmonds v. Parks, 329 P.3d 995 (Alaska 2014) (considering the 
state’s objection to tribal sovereignty in a child custody case in which the father 
was not a member of the tribe); see also Brief for Appellant at 10–14, Alaska v. 
Cent. Council of Tlingit Haida Tribes (Alaska 2013) (No. S-14935), available at 
https://turtletalk.files.wordpress.com/2014/07/state-brief.pdf (arguing that the 
tribes’ lack of Indian Country means tribes cannot assert jurisdiction). 
 68. 522 U.S. 520 (1998). 
 69. As described infra Part IV.A, this situation has been exacerbated by a 
federal regulation that prohibits Alaskan tribes from seeking to put land back 
into trust status that would have had the effect of re-instituting Indian Country 
to the extent necessary to sustain tribal governance. Very recently, the U.S. 
government has sought to reverse this policy, as it applies only to Alaska Native 
tribes, and to bring these communities within the more broadly stated federal 
Indian policy of putting land into trust status as a way of supporting self-
determination. 
 70. Venetie, 522 U.S. at 532. 
 71. See Mona Serageldin et. al., Local Government Actions to Reduce Poverty and 
Achieve the Millennium Development Goals, 2 GLOBAL URB. DEV. MAG. 1 (2006) 
(describing the various tools available to local governments to reduce poverty), 
available at http://www.globalurban.org/GUDMag06Vol2Iss1/Serageldin,% 
20Solloso,%20&%20Valenzuela%20PDF.pdf 
 72. See LIBBY RODERICK, ALASKA NATIVE CULTURES AND ISSUES: REPONSES TO 
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 64 (2010) (noting that, with the exception of the 
Metlakatla reservation, Alaska Natives are unable to open casinos because they 
do not own land designated as “Indian Country”). 
ARTICLE - KIMMEL (DO NOT DELETE) 1/26/2015  6:45 PM 
2014 FATE CONTROL AND HUMAN RIGHTS 189 
territoriality for Alaskan tribes. First, tribes cannot manage subsistence 
resources. Second, tribes lack the authority to regulate environmental 
quality to the same degree available to other tribes. Third, tribes lack the 
ability to tax and regulate activities that impact climate change. Finally, 
tribes do not have the legal authority to regulate public safety and 
therefore lack the capacity to protect their members. 
A. Management of Subsistence Resources 
“For Alaska Natives, subsistence lies at the heart of culture, the truths 
that give meaning to human life of every kind. Subsistence enables the 
Native peoples to feel at one with their ancestors, at home in the 
present, confident of the future.”73  
 
Subsistence lies at the heart of Alaska Native culture.74 It is much 
more than just a way of putting food on the table. Although ANCSA 
settled aboriginal land claims, it did not resolve the pressing issue of 
protecting subsistence rights for Alaska Natives. Typically, rights to 
traditional subsistence practices are legally protected in one of three 
ways: reservations, off-reservation treaty rights, or other federal 
preemptive legislation.75 ANCSA eliminated all reservations in Alaska 
(except for Metlakatla), precluding that option.76 Similarly, the lack of 
off-reservation treaty rights to subsistence, coupled with the State of 
Alaska’s rights to manage fish and game on both its and ANCSA’s land, 
foreclosed this path as an opportunity to protect this cultural right.77 The 
only option remaining to protect subsistence was through new, non-
ANCSA, federal legislation. 
Although the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act of 
1980 (ANILCA)78 provided for a subsistence preference in hunting and 
fishing,79 the fact that this issue is still an area rife with conflict 
underscores the fact that the current subsistence regulatory regime is far 
from satisfactory. Neither ANCSA nor ANILCA provided any 
opportunities for tribes to manage subsistence resources,80 and 
dissatisfaction remains with the extent of protections for subsistence 
 
 73. THOMAS R. BERGER, VILLAGE JOURNEY: THE REPORT OF THE ALASKA NATIVE 
REVIEW COMMISSION 55 (1985). 
 74. Id. 
 75. CASE & VOLUCK, supra note 54, at 268. 
 76. Id. at 270. 
 77. Id. 
 78. 16 U.S.C. §§ 3101–3233 (2012). 
 79. Id. § 3114. 
 80. CASE & VOLUCK, supra note 54, at 310. 
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harvest that the current regime provides.  
This Subpart provides a brief discussion of the regulatory 
framework established under ANILCA and current efforts to reformat 
that framework to integrate tribal participation in management. It then 
examines the U.S. Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972 (MMPA)81 as 
an alternative approach to protecting subsistence. While ANILCA 
provides for participation by Alaska Natives as stakeholders, MMPA 
affords greater opportunities for tribes to engage in resource 
management as rights holders. 
1. The Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act: Stakeholders, 
Not Rights-holders, in Subsistence Management 
 
ANILCA set aside 104 million acres of land in Alaska (out of a total 
375 million acres statewide) as federal parks, refuges, forests and 
conservation areas.82 Unlike conservation units in the continental United 
States, ANILCA allows subsistence hunting and fishing within these 
federal conservation units, and recognizes it as a priority consumptive 
use.83 Title VIII of the Act establishes that the “purpose . . . is to provide 
the opportunity for rural residents engaged in a subsistence way of life 
to do so.”84 The statute specifies that in times of a resource shortage, 
subsistence uses are given priority in allocation.85 Importantly, the Act 
designates “local” residents as the object of the statutory preference 
rather than Alaska Natives.86 Rural residents who can demonstrate a 
history of dependence on wild resources qualify as “subsistence” users 
for purposes of this management regime.87 
ANILCA likewise created a regional and local advisory system that 
provided a means for subsistence users to participate in natural resource 
decision-making.88 Section 809 specifically provides for the Secretary of 
Interior to enter into cooperative agreements “or otherwise cooperate 
with other federal agencies, the State, Native corporations, other 
appropriate persons and organizations and . . . other nations to 
effectuate the purposes and policies of this title.”89 Notably, this 
provision does not specify tribes among the list of potential governance 
 
 81. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361–1432h (2012). 
 82. ALLEN E. SMITH ET AL., ALASKA NATIONAL INTEREST LANDS CONSERVATION 
ACT CITIZEN’S GUIDE 10 (2001). 
 83. Id. at 29. 
 84. Id. at 33. 
 85. 16 U.S.C. § 3114 (2012). 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. SMITH ET AL., supra note 82, at 33–34 
 89. Id. 
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partners. Although ANILCA has created opportunities for rural 
Alaskans to participate in subsistence management decisions, the statute 
does not specify or recognize the unique tribal and traditional 
relationship between Alaska Natives and the resources managed under 
this statutory scheme. 
The State of Alaska set up a similar scheme providing for 
individual involvement in resource management.90 In both the federal 
and state systems, individual local rural residents sit on these boards, 
not representatives of local governments or tribes.91 The failure of these 
systems to protect subsistence traditions led to a movement within the 
Alaska Native community to integrate tribes as partners in subsistence 
management. In a white paper prepared by the Alaska Federation of 
Natives (AFN) for the 2012 presidential and congressional transitions, 
AFN stated that “the legal framework governing subsistence in Alaska 
significantly hampers the ability of Alaska Natives to access their 
traditional foods.”92 Blaming both the federal and state governments for 
failing to protect subsistence for Alaska Natives, AFN is currently 
pushing for new legislation to ensure a “Native” or “tribal” subsistence 
preference throughout Alaska.93  
The Alaska Native Subsistence Co-Management Demonstration Act 
of 201494 proposed a new co-management structure for the Ahtna region 
in Interior Alaska.95 This proposal would amend ANILCA to provide for 
co-management on traditional lands within this specific region, 
integrating tribal governance and doing away with the dual system of 
management currently in place.96 In his testimony in support of the bill, 
the President of Tanana Chiefs Conference stated, 
The lack of authority to manage hunting and fishing on our 
own ANCSA lands is one of the greatest existing injustices for 
Alaska Natives. This [bill] would remedy this injustice . . . . 
Protection of Alaska Native hunting and fishing will continue 
 
 90. CASE & VOLUCK, supra note 54, at 47. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Alaska Federation of Natives, Alaska Native Priorities for the 2012-2013 
Presidential & Congressional Transition: White Paper (Anchorage, Alaska: Alaska 
Federation of Natives, [2012]), http://www.nativefederation.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/10/AFN_TransitionWhitePaper_121912.pdf (accessed 
October 28, 2013). 
 93. Id. at 4–5. 
 94. The Alaska Native Subsistence Co-Management Demonstration Act of 
2014, H.R. Discussion Draft, 113th Cong. (2014) available at 
http://naturalresources.house.gov/calendar/eventsingle.aspx?EventID=371688 
(last accessed Sept. 14, 2014). 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
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to be the Alaska Native people’s number one priority until we 
see implementation on the ground of legislation establishing an 
Alaska Native priority and Alaska Native co-management.97 
Citing the failure of the state of Alaska and the federal government 
to protect subsistence resources, Dr. Rosita Worl urged Congress to 
adopt approaches more similar to the successful approaches adopted 
through the MMPA that authorizes co-management of subsistence 
resources in order to “ensur[e] the conservation of wildlife populations, 
and to ensure that Ahtna tribal members . . . continue their tribal 
hunting way of life.”98 
Shortly after the bill was introduced in the United States House of 
Representatives, the state of Alaska, through the Commissioner of Fish 
and Game, made it clear that the state did not support this effort. In a 
letter to Representative Don Young—the legislation’s sponsor— 
Commissioner Cora Campbell wrote “[t]he Alaska Constitution is 
unambiguous in reserving to the people for common use fish, wildlife 
and waters, while at the same time mandating a sustained yield of those 
same resources.”99 However, the State’s position fails to acknowledge 
that tribes can be viable, valuable partners in fish and game 
management. 
2. The Marine Mammal Protection Act: Tribes As Rights Holders 
 
Unlike ANILCA, the MMPA100 specifies the rights of Alaska 
Natives, not rural Alaskans, to hunt marine mammals for subsistence. 
The MMPA vested management authority for marine mammals with the 
federal government and prohibits all taking of marine mammals, with 
few exceptions.101 One of these exceptions allows Alaska Natives to 
continue to “take marine mammals in a non-wasteful manner for 
subsistence purposes or to create authentic native handicrafts or 
clothing.”102 In 1994, Congress amended the MMPA to authorize federal 
 
 97. Hearing on Wildlife Management Authority Within the State of Alaska under 
the Alaska National Interest Lands Act and the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act 
Before the Comm. on Energy & Natural Res., 113th Cong. (statement of Jerry Isaacs, 
President, Tanana Chiefs Conference) [hereinafter Wildlife Management Hearing]. 
 98. Wildlife Management Hearing, supra note 97 (statement of Rosita Worl, 
President, Sealaska Corp.). 
 99. Craig Medred, State Rejects Idea of Co-Management of Alaska Wildlife with 
Native Corporation, ALASKA DISPATCH NEWS (April 3, 2014), 
http://www.alaskadispatch.com/article/20140403/state-rejects-idea-co-
management-alaska-wildlife-native-corporation. 
 100. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361–1432h (2012). 
 101. CASE & VOLUCK, supra note 54, at 287. 
 102. Id. 
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agencies to enter into cooperative agreements with Alaska Native 
organizations for marine mammal subsistence management.103 These 
organizations include the Alaska Eskimo Whaling Commission, the 
Eskimo Walrus Commission, the Alaska Sea Otter and Steller Sea Lion 
Commission, and the Alaska Native Harbor Seal Commission.104 
Importantly, the MMPA recognizes the rights of Alaska Natives to 
harvest marine mammals and affords a subsistence priority to tribal 
members. In turn, these rights and priorities guide management 
practices. The MMPA’s provisions fostered unique co-management 
agreements rooted in and reflective of government-to-government 
relationships between Alaskan tribes and federal and state management 
agencies. Co-management agreements serve as a means to not only 
integrate local knowledge and needs into marine mammal management 
decisions, but as a way of ensuring more general ecosystem health, 
particularly in times of great environmental change.105 
Throughout the United States, Indian tribes engage in natural 
resource governance to varying degrees.106 In Alaska, the lack of a land 
base from which to assert jurisdiction over subsistence management 
prevents Alaskan tribes from exercising their rights as sovereigns to 
govern the resources upon which they depend. In the case of ANILCA, 
the failure to engage tribes in a sovereign partnership has left Alaskan 
tribes in a position where they need to seek changes to federal law in 
order to participate in subsistence management on a government-to-
government basis. 
B. Environmental Quality Regulation and Management 
Alaska tribes’ lack of territoriality prevents their participation in 
the type of environmental regulatory authority available to other tribes 
in the continental United States.107 While federal laws allow non-
 
 103. Id. at 289. 
 104. Id. 
 105. See, e.g., Martin D. Robards, et al., Limitations of an Optimum Sustainable 
Population or Potential Biological Removal Approach for Conserving Marine Mammals: 
Pacific Walrus Case Study, 91 J. OF ENVTL. MGMT. 57 (2009); C.D. Brower, et al., The 
Polar Bear Management Agreement for the Southern Beaufort Sea: An Evaluation of the 
First Ten Years of a Unique Conservation Agreement, 55 ARCTIC 362 (2002) 
(concluding that the agreement between Canadian First Nations and Alaskan 
tribes resulted in sustainable management practices and calling for increased 
monitoring and education to ensure continued success). 
 106. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY ET AL., TRIBAL SUCCESSES: PROTECTING THE 
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES 1 (2007), available at http:// 
www.penobscotnation.org/epa/epa.pdf. 
 107. 33 U.S.C. § 1377(e) (2012). 
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Alaskan Indian tribes to apply for treatment as a state when they seek to 
manage specific environmental programs under the federal Clean 
Water108 and Clean Air Acts,109 such applications are unavailable to 
Alaska tribes.110 Under the Clean Water Act, for example, the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is authorized to “treat an 
Indian tribe as a State for [certain] purposes” if certain criteria are met.111 
Resources, for example, must be “held by an Indian tribe, held by the 
U.S. in trust for Indians, held by a member of an Indian tribe if such 
property interest is subject to a trust restriction on alienation, or 
otherwise within the borders of an Indian reservation.”112 Lands 
transferred under ANCSA do not qualify under this subsection. The 
ability of Alaskan tribes to avail themselves of the opportunity to 
manage water and air quality under United States law is, therefore, 
preempted.  
 Though excluded from explicit water and air management, 
however, Alaskan tribes may work with the EPA through the Indian 
Environmental General Assistance Program,113 which authorizes 
funding through EPA to federally recognized tribes and tribal consortia 
to plan, develop, and establish environmental protection programs, 
including solid and hazardous waste programs.114 
C. Climate Change, Adaptation, and Resilience 
Loss of territoriality also limits the ability of Alaskan tribes to 
respond to climate change because of the commensurate lack of 
 
 108. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1388 (2012). 
 109. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q (2012). 
 110. Indian Tribes: Air Quality Planning and Management, 63 Fed. Reg. 7254 
(Feb. 12, 1989); 40 C.F.R. § 131.8 (2014). 
 111. 40 C.F.R. 131.8 (2014). 
 112. 33 U.S.C. § 1377(e)(2) (2012). 
 113. 42 U.S.C. § 4368b (2012). 
 114. Id. In 1984, the EPA became the first agency to adopt its own “Indian 
policy,” which defined how it would interact with tribes. WILLIAM D. 
RUCKELSHAUS, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA POLICY FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMS ON INDIAN RESERVATIONS, (1984), available at 
http://epa.gov/tp/pdf/indian-policy-84.pdf. While the policy describes how 
the EPA operates on Indian reservations, it was not directly relevant to most of 
Alaska (with the exception of the Metlakatla Indian reservation). Remedying 
this, subsequent EPA policy statements were more broadly articulated to include 
Alaska Native tribes. See ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA POLICY ON CONSULTATION 
AND COORDINATION WITH INDIAN TRIBES (2011), available at http:// 
www.epa.gov/tribalportal/pdf/cons-and-coord-with-indian-tribes-
policy.pdf.(identifying Alaska tribes as among those to whom these policies 
applied). 
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regulatory authority.115 Climate change has warmed Alaska more than 
twice as rapidly as the rest of the United States in the last sixty years.116 
The impacts of warmer temperatures include reduced sea ice, retreating 
glaciers, thawing permafrost, earlier snowmelts, and drier landscapes.117 
Temperatures, precipitation, and changes in snowmelt and permafrost 
are all expected to continue to increase, creating many changes in all 
aspects of life in America’s Arctic.118 Some of the more profound impacts 
of the rapidly changing climate include threats to community viability 
and infrastructure.119 Disappearing sea ice causes Alaska’s coastlines to 
erode, threatening communities living along the coast with 
displacement, and possibly forcing communities to relocate.120 Thawing 
permafrost alters wildlife habitats, increasing the frequency of wildfires, 
and altering the availability of safe drinking water sources.121 
Impacts to indigenous communities throughout the United States 
include loss of access to traditional foods, decreases in water quality and 
quantity, damage and loss to traditional lands, damages to community 
infrastructures, and the increasing threat of forcible relocation.122 
Furthermore, “without scientific monitoring, tribal decision makers lack 
the data needed to quantify and evaluate current conditions . . . and to 
plan and manage resources accordingly.”123 
At the same time, opening oceans and extended ice-and-snow-free 
seasons are creating unprecedented opportunities for economic 
development projects that require access to natural resources and the 
means to transport resources to market.124 But with increases in these 
economic opportunities, communities must be prepared to address both 
the “perceived threats and anticipated benefits.”125 The climate and 
 
 115. Alaska v. Native Vill. of Venetie Tribal Gov’t, 522 U.S. 520, 530–31 (1998). 
  116. F.S. CHAPIN ET AL., ALASKA, CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS IN THE UNITED 
STATES, THE THIRD NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT 516 (J. M. Melillo et al. eds., 
2014), available at http://nca2014.globalchange.gov/report/regions/alaska. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. ROBIN BRONEN & F.S. CHAPIN, ADAPTIVE GOVERNANCE AND INSTITUTIONAL 
STRATEGIES FOR CLIMATE-INDUCED COMMUNITY RELOCATIONS IN ALASKA 9322 
(Robert W. Kates et al. eds., 2013). 
 120. Id. at 9321. 
 121. CHAPIN ET AL., supra note 116 at 520. 
  122. BULL BENNETT & NANCY MAYNARD, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, LAND AND 
RESOURCES, CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS IN THE UNITED STATES, THIRD NATIONAL 
CLIMATE ASSESSMENT 298 (J.M. Melillo et al. eds., 2014), available at 
http://nca2014.globalchange.gov/report/sectors/indigenous-peoples. 
 123. Id. at 304. 
 124. Climate Impacts in Alaska, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, 
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/impacts-adaptation/alaska.html (last 
modified Sept. 9, 2013). 
 125. CHAPIN ET AL., supra note 116, at 523. 
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economic changes that communities throughout Alaska face require 
institutional strength and “strength from within in order to face an 
uncertain future.”126 
Just as global, national, and state governments and institutions 
evolve to adapt to the changing climate, tribes need governance tools to 
effectively respond to the needs of their communities. “To be effective 
and culturally appropriate, it is important that such institutional 
frameworks recognize the sovereignty of tribal governments and that 
any institutional development stems from significant engagement with 
tribal representatives.”127 
D. Public Safety 
Finally, lack of territoriality prevents tribal governments from 
protecting the safety of their members. Alaska ranks first in the United 
States for suicide and intimate partner homicides, and more than half of 
Alaskan women have been victims of sexual violence.128 Only thirty-
nine of the 220 rural communities have courthouses,129 and most lack 
public safety personnel.130 Seventy-five of the more than 220 villages 
have no law enforcement,131 and only one community has a shelter for 
domestic violence victims.132 For many, accessing law enforcement or a 
shelter requires an airplane ride, with all its associated costs.133 Alaska 
Native women are especially vulnerable: while Alaska Native women 
are less than 20% of the state’s overall population, they represent nearly 
half of all reported rape victims.134 Children are also susceptible to 
community violence, with the impacts falling disproportionately on 
Alaska Native children, who comprise more than half of all 
 
 126. Id. 
 127. BENNETT & MAYNARD, supra note 122, at 307. 
 128. Council on Domestic Violence & Sexual Assault, Intimate Partner Violence 
and Sexual Violence in the State of Alaska: Key Results from the 2010 Alaska 
Victimization Survey, UAA JUSTICE CENTER (2010), http://justice.uaa.alaska.edu/ 
research/2010/1004.avs_2010/1004.07a.statewide_summary.pdf (last visited 
Oct. 3, 2014). 
 129. See generally ALASKA LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION, 2012 ALASKA TRIBAL 
COURT DIRECTORY (2012), available at www.alaskatribes.org/uploads/2012-tc-
directory.pdf (listing all communities and noting which have courthouses). 
 130. INDIAN LAW AND ORDER COMMISSION, A ROADMAP FOR MAKING NATIVE 
AMERICA SAFER: REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES 
ch. 3, at 67 (2013), available at http://www.aisc.ucla.edu/iloc/report/ 
files/Chapter_3_STJ.pdf. 
 131. Id. ch. 2, at 47, available at http://www.aisc.ucla.edu/iloc/report/files/ 
Chapter_2_Alaska.pdf. 
 132. Id. at 41. 
 133. See id. (noting distances between women and these services). 
 134. Id. 
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maltreatment reports to Child Protective Services.135 
Report after report chronicles these deficiencies. In late 2013, the 
United States Indian Law and Order Commission found that “the 
problems in Alaska are so severe . . . [they] are no longer just Alaska’s 
issues; they are national issues.”136 In 2012, the United Nations Special 
Rapporteur on Indigenous Rights identified “continuing systemic 
barriers to the full realization of indigenous peoples’ rights.”137 In 2007, 
Amnesty International described barriers that deny indigenous women 
access to justice and perpetuate intolerable levels of sexual and domestic 
violence in Alaska.138 
The lack of territoriality has very specific legal consequences for the 
ability of Alaskan tribes to protect their communities and thus ensure 
their wellbeing. For example, the United States Congress reauthorized 
the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA)139 for the third time on 
March 7, 2013.140 VAWA included provisions specifically designed to 
expand tribal jurisdiction over domestic violence crimes.141 However, 
VAWA specifically excluded Alaska Native tribes from this provision, 
not because they are not governments, but because of the perceived lack 
of Indian Country to support tribal jurisdiction.142 
In November of 2013, the Indian Law and Order Commission 
(ILOC) issued a report entitled “A Roadmap for Making Native America 
Safer.”143 Their findings regarding the lack of justice in Indian Country 
led to a recommendation to “reinforc[e] the power of locally based 
Tribal criminal justice systems” as part of a broader set of 
 
 135. Id. at 43. 
 136. Id. at Executive Summary xii, available at http://www.aisc.ucla.edu/ 
iloc/report/files/Front_Material.pdf. 
 137. U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples: The Situation of Indigenous Peoples in the United States of 
America, U.N. Doc A/HRC/21/47/Add.1 (Aug. 30 2012), available at 
http://jurist.org/documents/Anaya-Report-US-2012.pdf. 
 138. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, MAZE OF INJUSTICE: THE FAILURE TO PROTECT 
INDIGENOUS WOMEN FROM SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN THE USA (2007), available at 
www.amnestyusa.org/pdfs/MazeOfInjustice.pdf. 
 139. S. Res. 47, 113th Cong. (2013) (enacted). 
 140. Id. 
 141. 25 U.S.C. § 1304 (2012). 
 142. See Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. 113-4, 
127 Stat. 54 § 910(a) (“In the State of Alaska, the amendments made by sections 
904 and 905 [recognition of civil domestic violence jurisdiction over “any 
person”] shall only apply to the Indian country (as defined in section 1151 of 
title 18, United States Code) of the Metlakatla Indian Community, Annette 
Island Reserve.”). 
 143. INDIAN LAW AND ORDER COMMISSION, A ROADMAP FOR MAKING NATIVE 
AMERICA SAFER (2014), available at http://www.aisc.ucla.edu/iloc/report/ 
index.html. 
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recommendations related to reinstating and recognizing Indian Country 
in Alaska. 144 Specifically, the Report called for: 
 Amending ANCSA to provide for lands transferred under that 
Act to be included as Indian Country under federal law;145 
 Clarifying and affirming that Native allotments and townsites 
are Indian country;146 
 Amending ANCSA to allow regional corporations to transfer 
lands to tribal governments and provide that those lands can 
be put back into trust status, reinvigorating their status as 
trust lands and therefore capable of sustaining tribal 
governance.147 
In the context of public safety, ILOC recommended reestablishing 
territorial sovereignty for Alaska Native tribal governments as a vital 
step to improve public safety in rural communities.148 Land-based 
jurisdiction is critical, because even though the Alaska Supreme Court 
recognizes the “non-territorial sovereign authority”149 of tribes to govern 
themselves, the extent of that authority remains an uncertain question. 
Moreover, the Governor’s office maintains the position that the lack of 
Indian Country creates an insurmountable obstacle to local control, and 
thus creates additional impediments for tribes seeking to protect their 
communities from violence.150 
These four consequences impact the capacity of tribal governments 
to ensure that their communities have the tools necessary to survive and 
thrive in times of change. The next Part illustrates two distinct 
approaches that Alaskan tribes have taken to break through these 
obstacles: asserting their right to self-determination, and creating 
 
 144. Troy A. Eid, Summary Presentation of A Roadmap for Making Native 
America Safer, INDIAN LAW AND ORDER COMMISSION (Nov. 2013), 
http://www.aisc.ucla.edu/iloc/report/files/A_Roadmap_For_Making_Native
_America_Safer.pdf. 
 145. INDIAN LAW AND ORDER COMMISSION, supra note 143, at 51. 
 146. Id. at 52. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. at 51. 
 149. Simmonds v. Parks, 329 P.3d 995, 1008–09 (Alaska 2014). 
 150. In comments to the ILOC, the Alaska Attorney General took the position 
that the lack of Indian Country meant that tribes had jurisdiction in only two 
arenas: (1) the authority of tribes to determine tribal membership and (2) the 
authority to regulate disputes involving child protection and child custody 
when both parents and the child are members of the tribe. Letter from Michael 
Geraghty, Attorney General, Alaska, to Troy Eid, Chairman, ILOC (Feb. 1, 2013) 
(on file with author). The Attorney General argued that the lack of territoriality 
is fatal to tribal authority beyond these two areas, saying “land status is 
particularly important because tribal authority centers on the land held by the 
tribe and on tribal members within the reservation.” Id. Because no reservations 
other than Metlakatla exist in Alaska, there is no basis for tribal authority. The 
State continues to make this argument to object to the exercise of tribal authority 
in a judicial arena as well. See e.g., Simmonds, 329 P.3d at 1009–10. 
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capacity to control the fates and futures of their communities. 
IV. INNOVATIONS IN LOCAL GOVERNANCE 
Despite the obstacles the lack of territorial sovereignty presents, 
Alaska Native tribes continue to assert fate control and, in doing so, 
have found innovative ways to promote human development. This 
section describes two distinct approaches for achieving effective self-
governance. First, due to a proposed change in federal regulation, 
Alaska Native tribes may soon be able to put land back into “Indian 
Country” status, thus extending their territorial reach. Second, Alaska 
Native tribes have taken advantage of science and traditional 
knowledge as a point of entry into an otherwise off-limits resource 
management regime. As this Article concludes, both approaches are 
necessary for tribal governments to exercise self-determination and 
build their capacity for fate control. 
A. Increasing Indian Country: Taking Land Back Into Trust Status 
Throughout the United States, Indian tribes are re-purchasing lands 
once lost during the federal allotment era, and putting those lands back 
into federal trust status.151 For Alaska Native tribes, however, this option 
has been unavailable, until now.152 In May of 2014, the Department of 
Interior issued a draft regulation allowing Alaskan lands to be returned 
to trust status, recasting them as “Indian country” capable of supporting 
tribal governance.153 
In 1887, Congress passed the General Allotment Act,154 otherwise 
known as the Dawes Severalty Act.155 The Act deeded parcels of land 
within the borders of Indian reservations across the United States to 
individual Indians for agricultural and grazing purposes.156 Much of the 
 
 151. Larry Schumacher, Solving a Land-Control Dilemma, RURAL MINN. J. (2014), 
available at http://www.ruralmn.org/rmj_winter2014/rmj2014q3-land-control-
dilemma. 
 152. Teresa Hull & Linda Leask, Dividing Alaska 1867-2000: Changing Land 
Ownership and Management, 32 ALASKA R. SOC. & ECON. CONDITIONS 1, 6–9, (2000), 
available at http://www.iser.uaa.alaska.edu/Publications/Landswebfiles/ 
lands.pdf. 
 153.  News Release, United States Department of the Interior, Secretary Jewell 
Issues Secretarial Order Affirming American Indian Trust Responsibilities (Aug. 
20, 2014), available at http://www.bia.gov/cs/groups/public/documents/ 
text/idc1-027607.pdf. 
 154. 25 U.S.C. §§ 331–33 (1994), repealed by 114 Stat. 2007 (2000). 
 155. Id. 
 156. Lauren L. Fuller, Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act: Analysis of the 
Protective Clauses of the Act Through a Comparison with the Dawes Act of 1887, 4 AM. 
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land allotted under the Act was quickly lost, reservations were carved 
up, and the tribal land base fractured, making self-governance difficult if 
not impossible.157 The amount of land held in trust for indigenous tribes 
fell from 138 million acres in 1887 to 52 million acres in 1934.158 
During subsequent eras, policies of Indian self-determination 
replaced policies of assimilation, and federal law shifted its focus 
towards support for self-governance.159 One example includes the 
Indian Reorganization Act of 1934.160 The Indian Reorganization Act 
included a provision authorizing the Secretary of the Interior to convert 
private land back into Indian Country upon petition by a tribal member 
or tribal government.161 In 1936, this provision was extended to include 
the then-territory of Alaska.162 
After ANCSA passed in 1971, the Native Village of Venetie tribal 
government petitioned for the lands ceded to its village corporation to 
be returned back to Indian Country pursuant to the Indian 
Reorganization Act.163 In response, an Associate Solicitor for Indian 
Affairs denied their request, finding that ANCSA intended to 
“permanently remove all Native lands in Alaska from trust status.”164 
Two years later, this “Alaska exception” was codified in a federal 
regulation, and tribes in Alaska lost the opportunity to petition the 
federal government to return lands to Indian Country.165 
That position became the subject of litigation in 2007 when four 
tribes challenged the Alaska exception in Akiachak Native Community v. 
Salazar.166 Six years later, the Federal District Court ruled in favor of the 
 
INDIAN L. REV. 269, 270 (1976). 
 157. Frank Pommersheim, Land Into Trust: An Inquiry Into Law, Policy, and 
History, 49 IDAHO L. REV. 519, 521–23 (2012). 
 158. Id. at 522. 
 159. Paul Spruhan, A Legal History of Blood Quantum in Federal Indian Law to 
1935, 51 S.D. L. REV 1, 45–46 (2006). 
 160. Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 (Wheeler-Howard Act), ch. 576, 48 
Stat. 984 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 461 et seq). 
 161. Id. at ch. 576 § 17, 48 Stat. 988(codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 477 
(2012)). 
 162. Act of May 1, 1936, Pub. L. No. 74-538, 49 Stat. 1250 (codified at 25 U.S.C. 
§ 473a). See also Land Acquisitions in the State of Alaska, 79 Fed. Reg. 24,648-01, 
24,649 (proposed May 1, 2014) (to be codified as 25 C.F.R. pt. 151) (explaining the 
history of the Alaska Exclusion). 
 163. Land Acquisitions in the State of Alaska, 79 Fed. Reg. at 24,649; see also 
Alaska v. Native Vill. of Venetie Tribal Gov’t, 522 U.S. 520, 524–33 (1998) 
(finding that the Native Village of Venetie was not considered Indian country 
after lands were transferred to private corporations and then subsequently 
conveyed back to the tribe). 
 164. Land Acquisitions in the State of Alaska, 79 Fed. Reg. at 24,649. 
 165. Land Acquisitions, 25 C.F.R. pt. 120a (1980). 
 166. 935 F. Supp. 2d 195, 201 (D.D.C. 2013), appeal docketed, No. 13-5361 (D.C. 
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tribes, removed the Alaska exception, and found that Congress did not 
explicitly prevent Alaskan tribes from petitioning to have lands put into 
trust.167 Thus, by denying the tribes’ petitions to return their land, the 
state violated the tribes’ right to enjoy the privileges and immunities 
“available to all other federally recognized tribes by virtue of their status 
as Indian tribes.”168 
As of this writing, that decision is under appeal. In May of 2014, 
however, the Department of the Interior issued regulations to eliminate 
the Alaska exception.169 In doing so, the Department of the Interior 
opened the door to petitions to place lands back into trust. In addition to 
determining that there was no legal basis upon which to issue the 
Alaska exception, the Department of the Interior justified its position as 
consistent with the policy of “honoring of principles of tribal self-
reliance and self-governance.”170 Likewise, the Federal Register notice 
identifies other federal findings, such as one from the Indian Law and 
Order Commission report that emphasized the need to promote self-
determination by expanding the land base available to tribal 
governance, as well as one stating that providing trust lands in Alaska 
would offer additional authority for tribes to partner with the State of 
Alaska to deal with issues of public safety and community resilience.171 
While the lack of a land base has very real legal consequences for 
the ability of tribes to self-govern, it has attitudinal consequences as 
well. The state of Alaska litigates, for example, against tribes asserting 
self-governance and argues that the lack of territorial jurisdiction 
impedes the exercise of tribal jurisdiction in almost every 
circumstance.172 Troy Eid, Chairman of the Indian Law and Order 
Commission, has stated that, according to his research, no state in the 
United States spends more money per capita litigating against its own 
citizens than Alaska, referring to the amount of money Alaska spent 
fighting the exercise of tribal jurisdiction.173 Eid implored the state to 
avoid “treat[ing] Alaska Natives as stakeholders.”174 Turning to the 
audience during a speech, he said, “you are not stakeholders. You are 
 
Cir. Dec. 4, 2013). 
 167. Id. at 210–11. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Land Acquisitions in the State of Alaska, 79 Fed. Reg. at 24,649. 
 170. Id. at 24,651. 
 171. Id. 
 172. See, e.g., Akiachak Native Cmty., 935 F. Supp. 2d at 201; Alaska v. Native 
Vill. of Venetie Tribal Gov’t., 522 U.S. 520, 524–33 (1998). 
 173. TananaChiefsConference, 2014 TCC Keynote Speaker – Troy Eid, YOUTUBE 
(March 25, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w7ubqZsKi2c. 
 174. Id. 
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members of sovereign governments.”175 
B. The Yukon River Intertribal Watershed Council: Innovations In 
Governance 
Defined as “great river” in the Gwich’in language,176 the Yukon 
River is the fourth largest watershed in the United States,177 and the 
largest free flowing river in the world.178 The river flows for 2,300 miles 
(3,700 kilometers) from its headwaters in Yukon Territory, Canada, 
through Alaska and out into the Bering Straits.179 “With a little jig-
sawing, the drainage basin of the Yukon River could contain all of Texas 
and California, the largest of the contiguous states, or sixteen of the little 
ones.”180 
Because of its size and location, the Yukon River watershed 
contains not only a diverse eco-system but also varied and complex 
governance regimes.181 The complexities and confusion caused by 
legislation and litigation left no clear path for Alaska Native tribes to 
assert a right to self-govern water rights within the Yukon watershed. 
This Subpart examines the complex situation in the Yukon River 
watershed and the innovative ways in which the Alaska Native tribes 
are asserting their right to self-governance. 
1. Diversity In The Yukon River Watershed 
 
The Yukon River watershed is one of the most diverse ecosystems 
in North America and is vital to the ecosystems of the Bering and 
Chukchi Seas.182 Its relatively undisturbed ecosystem has thousands of 
lakes, ponds, sloughs, wetlands, and river habitats.183 The river basin is 
home to more than 150 bird species, 40 mammal species, and 18 species 
 
 175. Id. 
 176. T. LOMAX ET AL., ALASKA MONITORING AND ASSESSMENT PROGRAM 2009 
YUKON RIVER CONDITION SUMMARY 1 (2012), available at http:// 
dec.alaska.gov/water/wqsar/monitoring/documents/YukonReport_Final.pdf. 
 177. TIMOTHY BRABETS ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL AND HYDROLOGIC OVERVIEW OF 
THE YUKON RIVER BASIN, ALASKA AND CANADA 1 (2000), available at 
ak.water.usgs.gov/Publications/pdf.reps/wrir99.4204.pdf. 
 178. LOMAX ET AL., supra note 176, at 3. 
 179. About Us: It All Begins with the Yukon River, YUKON RIVER PANEL, 
http://yukonriverpanel.com/salmon/ (last visited Sept. 10, 2014). 
 180. DAN O’NEILL, A LAND GONE LONESOME: AN INLAND VOYAGE AMONG THE 
YUKON RIVER 12 (2006). 
 181. BRABETS ET AL., supra note 177, at 12–13. 
 182. Id. 
 183. LOMAX ET AL., supra note 176, at 4. 
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of fish.184 The Yukon provides eight percent of the Arctic Ocean’s fresh 
water supply and is one of the longest salmon runs in the world.185 
But the changing climate is impacting the lands and waters within 
the basin. Warming temperatures result in an earlier and longer spring 
melt period, increased permafrost thawing, increased runoff, and 
erosion.186 These changes impact water quality, potentially causing 
disease and a rise in contamination levels for both fish and water.187 The 
extent of these changes, and the ability to adequately assess their 
impacts on local communities, is difficult to determine because of the 
lack of temporal and spatial data about the river’s water quality.188 
The Yukon watershed has long been home to over 126,000 people 
and approximately seventy Alaskan tribes and Canadian First 
Nations.189 Within Alaska, the Yukon River communities include 62 
individual tribes of the Cup’ik, Yup’ik, Koyukon, and Gwich’in 
Athabascan tribal nations.190 Approximately 83 percent of the 
population living along the river is indigenous, and subsistence is a 
necessary way of life for these communities.191 The river and 
surrounding lands provide over half of the food supply and all of the 
drinking water for the villages living within the watershed.192 As most of 
these communities are inaccessible by road, the river also provides a 
critical transportation corridor.193  
On the Alaska side of the Yukon watershed, lands are owned by 
three different entities. Over two-thirds of the land within the Alaskan 
Yukon watershed is federally owned and managed as some form of 
conservation unit, such as a national park or wild and scenic river, 
although the United States military also holds title to a small percentage 
of these lands.194 The state of Alaska and Alaska Native corporations, 
both village and regional, also own lands within the watershed.195 
As a result of the variety of landowners, natural resources 
 
 184. Id. 
 185. Chinook, YUKON RIVER PANEL, http://www.yukonriverpanel.com/ 
salmon/about/yukon-river-salmon/chinook/ (last visited Sept. 10, 2014). 
 186. Lauren E. Hay & Gregory J. McCabe, Hydrologic Effects of Climate Change 
in the Yukon River Basin, 100 CLIMACTIC CHANGE 509, 510 (2010). 
 187. Monique G. Dubé et al., Accumulated State of the Yukon River Watershed: 
Part I Critical Review of Literature, 9 INTEGRATED ENVTL. ASSESSMENT & MGMT. 426, 
428 (2013). 
 188. Id. at 436. 
 189. BRABETS ET AL., supra note 177, at 1. 
 190. LOMAX ET AL., supra note 176, at 5. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Dubé et al., supra note 187, at 428; LOMAX ET AL., supra note 176, at 5. 
 193. BRABETS ET AL., supra note 177, at 1. 
 194. Id. at 12. 
 195. Id. at 13. 
ARTICLE - KIMMEL (DO NOT DELETE) 1/26/2015  6:45 PM 
204 ALASKA LAW REVIEW [31:2 
management in the basin is varied. For example, the Alaska Department 
of Fish and Game and the United States Fish and Wildlife Service are 
responsible for managing subsistence resources along the river.196 The 
Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation and the United 
States Environmental Protection Agency are responsible for managing 
water quality.197 A variety of federal agencies are responsible for 
managing habitat within the basin, along with the Alaska Department of 
Natural Resources.198 In addition, many of the wildlife species along the 
river are subject to international treaties such as the Migratory Bird 
Treaty.199 
The complex system of environmental management within the 
Yukon watershed subjects the communities to a variety of governance 
regimes. All of the Alaska Native communities have a tribal council, and 
a few also have cities organized under state law.200 Most of the 
communities are located within the unorganized borough,201 which 
means that the State of Alaska exercises regional governance powers.202 
There are two Alaska Native corporations within the region: Doyon 
Corporation, with its corollary non-profit organization, Tanana Chiefs 
Conference, and Calista Corporation, with its non-profit affiliate, the 
 
 196. See LOMAX ET AL., supra note 176, at 4 (“Subsistence . . . fisheries are 
actively managed by the Alaska Department of Fish and Game . . . .”); Federal 
Subsistence Fisheries Management on the Yukon River, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., 
http://www.fws.gov/alaska/fisheries/fieldoffice/fairbanks/subsistence.htm 
(last visited Oct. 4, 2014) (discussing the U.S. Fish & Wildife Service’s 
management of fisheries in the Yukon River for subsistence use). 
 197. See LOMAX ET AL., supra note 176, at 1 (discussing the Alaska Department 
of Environmental Conservation and the United States Environmental Protection 
Agency’s collaboration in completing a water quality field study of the Yukon 
River). 
 198. See BRABETS ET AL., supra note 177, at 12–13 (discussing the Bureau of 
Land Management’s ownership of twenty-two percent of the Yukon River 
Basin); Yukon Tanana Area Plan, ALASKA DEP’T OF NATURAL RES., 
http://dnr.alaska.gov/mlw/planning/areaplans/ytap/ (last visited Oct. 4, 
2014) (discussing the Alaska Department of Natural Resources’s establishment 
of management guidelines for land including the basin). 
 199. Convention Between the United States and Great Britain for the 
Protection of Migratory Birds, U.S.-Gr. Brit., Dec. 8, 1916, 39 Stat. 1702. 
 200. Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible to Receive Services from the 
United States Bureau of Indian Affairs, 74 Fed. Reg. 40218-02 (Aug. 11, 2009) 
(including list of Native Entities with the State of Alaska). 
 201. Legislative Directive for Unorganized Borough Review, ALASKA DEP’T OF 
COMMERCE, CMTY., AND ECON. DEV.: DIV. OF CMTY. AND REG’L AFFAIRS, 
http://www.commerce.state.ak.us/dca/lbc/boroughstudy/study_materials.ht
m (last visited Sept. 10, 2014). 
 202. ALASKA COMMISSION ON RURAL GOVERNANCE AND EMPOWERMENT, FINAL 
REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR 26–27 (1999), available at http:// 
www.commerce.state.ak.us/dca/RGC/RGC_Final_6_99.pdf. 
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Association of Village Council Presidents.203 Each of the sixty villages 
has a for-profit corporation that own lands in and around their 
respective communities.204 Despite the numerous different governments 
involved in the Watershed, or perhaps because of it, there remains a 
huge gap regarding water quality monitoring and regulation, as well as 
a corresponding lack of scientific data.205 
2. A Case Study in Fate Control: Water Rights Within The Yukon 
Watershed 
 
In December of 1997, representatives of more than thirty Alaskan 
tribes and Canadian First Nations met in the community of Galena.206 
Those gathered met out of a common concern for the future of the 
watershed and its people. The goal of the meeting was to “organize, 
address, discuss and plan for environmental stewardship of the Yukon 
River.”207 
During the three-day summit, participants described growing 
concerns about threats to the river posed by human activity. People 
discussed the dangers posed by contaminants and pollutants left over 
from intense military activity during the Cold War, and described their 
concerns that these pollutants caused cancer related illnesses and death 
within their communities.208 People also raised the issue of mining and 
its impacts on water quality, as well as other community-based 
pollutants.209 
The Yukon River Inter-Tribal Watershed Council (the “Council”) 
formed as a result of the three-day meeting.210 The attendees adopted a 
mission statement by consensus pledging to “initiate and continue the 
 
 203. DOYON LIMITED, http://www.doyon.com (last visited Sept. 10, 2014); 
CALISTA CORPORATION, http://www.clistacorp.com (last visited Sept. 10, 2014). 
 204. ALASKA COMMISSION ON RURAL GOVERNANCE AND EMPOWERMENT, FINAL 
REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR 24, 27, 31 (1999), available at 
http://www.commerce.state.ak.us/dca/RGC/RGC_Final_6_99.pdf. 
 205. Oasis Environmental, Dutch Harbor Water Quality and Impairment Analysis 
Final Report, ALASKA DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION 3-7 to -8 (June 27, 2006), 
https://dec.alaska.gov/water/wnpspc/protection_restoration/DutchIliuliuk/d
ocuments/06DutchHarborImpairmentAnalysis.pdf. 
 206. YUKON RIVER INTER-TRIBAL WATERSHED COUNCIL (YRITWC), YUKON RIVER 
INTER-TRIBAL WATERSHED PROTECTION SUMMIT DEC. 11-14, 1997, GALENA ALASKA, 
THE FIRST EVER MEETING DEVOTED TO TRIBAL CONCERNS ABOUT THE YUKON RIVER 
WATERSHED: HISTORICAL OVERVIEW, MEETING SUMMARY AND RELATED 
INFORMATION(YUKON RIVERS SUMMIT) 9 (1998) (on file with the author). 
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 208. Id. at 12. 
 209. Id. at 13–18. 
 210. Id. at 18. 
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clean up and preservation of the Yukon River for the protection of our 
own and future generations of our Tribes/First Nations and for the 
continuation of our traditional Native way of life.”211 The organization’s 
vision is simple: to be able to drink water directly from the Yukon 
River.212 Since its formation, the Council has operated a variety of 
programs within the Watershed, all designed to promote local 
environmental governance and stewardship.213 
One of the flagship programs is the Council’s Water Quality 
Monitoring Program. This program is the largest indigenous 
international monitoring network in the world, collecting data at over 
fifty sites along the River.214 Jon Waterhouse, Executive Director of the 
Council, explained that although the Council did not set out to collect 
“scientific” data, the benefit of doing so quickly became clear: collecting 
water quality data has became a way for indigenous people to express 
their concerns to western scientists and land managers.215 
In addition to the knowledge gained through this program, the 
Council has been instrumental in building environmental governance 
capacity among its member tribes. By 2013, sixteen years after the 
creation of Council, over forty of the fifty-five Alaskan member tribes 
operated at least one environmental program, including solid waste 
disposal, backhauling, and water quality monitoring programs.216 
3. Reclaiming Self-Governance Through Science 
 
Despite possessing water quality information along the Yukon 
River, the Council and its member tribes lack the authority to use it. In 
2011, the Council initiated a project to reassert authority over water 
quality, the motivation for which was described by Council Executive 
Director John Waterhouse: 
As we set out water quality standards and define what we 
expect clean water to be, we will then be able to apply that on 
 
 211. YRITWC Mission, YUKON RIVER INTER-TRIBAL WATERSHED COUNCIL, 
http://www.yritwc.org/ (last visited September 11, 2014). 
 212. About Us, YUKON RIVER INTER-TRIBAL WATERSHED COUNCIL, 
http://www.yritwc.org/About-Us/About-Us.aspx (last visited Oct. 11, 2014). 
 213. Strategic Plan, YUKON RIVER INTER-TRIBAL WATERSHED COUNCIL, 
http://www.yritwc.org/About-Us/Strategic-Plan.aspx (last visited Oct. 11, 
2014). 
 214. Interview with Ryan Toohey, Sci. Dir., Yukon River Inter-Tribal 
Watershed Council, in Anchorage, Alaska (Sept. 6, 2013). 
 215. Interview with Jon Waterhouse, Exec. Dir., Yukon River Inter-Tribal 
Watershed Council, in Anchorage, Alaska (Feb. 28, 2013). 
 216. Various telephone interviews conducted by Author with each member 
community. 
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the river. We are making our own decisions about our own 
lives rather than having someone else have that control. This 
governance project is a way of regaining the ground lost in 
ANCSA. It is a way of describing to the government that this 
water is part of us, it is our connection to the planet. If you 
can’t make the decisions for yourself and apply them, you are 
not sovereign and not self-determining. The [governance] 
project puts us in the decision making seat.217 
During the 2011 summit, Council leadership adopted a resolution 
calling for the development of a “strategy to assert and implement 
indigenous water rights.”218 As part of this effort, the Council drafted 
basin-wide water quality standards based on both indigenous 
knowledge and scientific data.219 The goal of this proposed plan is 
twofold: first, to improve water quality throughout the watershed and, 
second, to support the ability of indigenous governments impacted by 
the river’s water quality to participate in the decision-making process.220 
4. Governance Through Innovation 
 
Alaskan tribes living along the Yukon River do not have the 
statutory authority to co-manage the resources within the watershed. 
The lack of an Alaska Native preference precludes the participation of 
tribal governments in the subsistence regulatory process. The lack of 
Indian Country means tribes cannot apply for “Treatment as State” 
status under Environmental Protection Agency rules. And the failure of 
Alaska to engage with tribes as sovereigns cripples the abilities of these 
governments to act to protect water quality. 
Overcoming these obstacles requires an innovative legal approach 
to leverage tribal water rights. As a result of the Ninth Circuit’s decision 
in Katie John v. United States, the federal government has management 
authority over much of the land in the watershed.221 Combined with the 
 
 217. Interview with Jon Waterhouse, Exec. Dir. of the Yukon River Inter-
Tribal Watershed Council, in Anchorage Alaska (Feb. 28, 2013). 
 218. YUKON RIVER INTER-TRIBAL WATERSHED COUNCIL, WATER RIGHTS 
RESOLUTION (2011) [hereinafter Council Resolution] (unpublished resolution) (on 
file with author). 
 219. Id. 
 220. See generally YUKON RIVER INTER-TRIBAL WATERSHED COUNCIL, WATER 
QUALITY PLAN (2013) (unpublished document) (on file with author). 
 221. Katie John v. U.S. (Katie John I), 247 F.3d 1032 (9th Cir. 2001). In Katie 
John I several Alaska Natives and the Village Council of Mentasta sued the U.S. 
in 1994 claiming that the Fish and Wildlife Service was not managing navigable 
waters as public lands and therefore not conforming to the subsistence 
protections afforded to public lands under ANILCA. As a result of that 
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co-management provisions contained within Section 809 of ANILCA, 
this could be the foundation for a governance regime that shares 
management authority between tribes and federal agencies. 
 In addition, the fact that the tribes and Council are in possession of 
the majority of scientific data about water quality within the Yukon 
watershed puts the tribes in a unique position: they possess the science, 
and thus should have a seat at the table.222 The approach taken by the 
Council is unique in that it forges a pathway to self and shared 
governance through knowledge and science instead of relying on a 
specific statutory right to governance. The tribes, through the Council, 
have developed an innovative approach to compensate for these 
obstacles by building institutions and knowledge to support their 
capacity to become critical governance partners. 
Even if tribes living along the Yukon were able to put land back 
into trust status as a result of Akiachak,223 that alone would not solve the 
issue of tribal management of lands and resources within the watershed. 
Because of the checkerboard land ownership patterns within the Yukon 
watershed, and the overlapping complicated layers of federal, state and 
tribal governance, no single land-owner or sovereign can function in 
ignorance of the others. Rather, all three sovereigns must come together 
in a cooperative manner to share governance in order to ensure that the 
Yukon River watershed’s resources are managed for the benefit of the 
watershed’s people and wildlife. 
The Council’s governance strategy relies on their possession of 
most of the scientific and traditional knowledge about the river as a way 
 
litigation, United States courts directed the Secretary of the Interior to manage 
navigable waters within federal conservation units in accordance with the legal 
doctrine of “federal reserved water rights.” John v. United States (Katie John II), 
720 F.3d 2014, 1221 (9th Cir. 2013). This doctrine means that “reserved waters” 
are to be managed for the same purposes as the adjacent lands: (1) to promote a 
rural subsistence priority; (2) to protect fish and wildlife; (3) to protect and 
improve the river’s water quality (for functioning habitat for fish and wildlife); 
and (4) to honor and implement international agreements (such as the Pacific 
Salmon Treaty commitments within the Yukon River). See id. at 1229–30 
(discussing the federal reserved water rights doctrine which allows the United 
States to reserve waters appurtenant to federally reserved lands to fulfill the 
purposes of that reservation, which may include the protection of fish and 
wildlife). Although this gave the United States Fish and Wildlife Service 
management authority over river stretches within and adjacent to federal lands 
within the Yukon River Basin, the case did not recognize the rights of Alaska 
Native tribes to manage these waters. See id. at 1243 (“We need not decide 
whether Alaska Native allotments can give rise to federal reserved water 
rights.”). 
 222. Interview with Jon Waterhouse, Exec. Dir. of the Yukon River Inter-
Tribal Watershed Council, in Anchorage Alaska (Feb. 28, 2013). 
 223. See supra Part IV.A. 
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to wedge open the door to shared management. It is early in this 
process, and too soon to know how successful this effort will be, but 
clearly the tribes have assumed the responsibility of carving a role for 
themselves in water governance. 
CONCLUSION 
The consequences and responses of the loss of territoriality to the 
capacity of Alaskan tribes to govern are multi-dimensional. Tribes 
continue to fight for the right to self-govern and the capacity to control 
their own fates and futures in a variety of ways. This Article has 
described two such arenas: the federal regulatory framework that would 
allow the expansion of “Indian Country” to support territoriality, and an 
approach that relies on science and traditional knowledge as a pathway 
into governance. 
As this Article describes, the return of land to Indian Country alone 
cannot cure the problems stemming from the initial loss of territoriality. 
Public policies designed to address issues of wellbeing must respond to 
the very real ways that the loss of lands have impacted the communities 
as described here. Appropriate policy responses should rely on both 
reinstating the land base from which tribes can assert sovereign 
authority, and adopting innovations in governance to integrate tribal 
governments as sovereign partners. 
As a matter of domestic law, Alaska courts recognize that tribes 
have “non-territorial authority” over tribal members and may retain 
some amount of territorial authority.224 As a matter of policy, adaptive 
governance frameworks offer institutional ideas about integrating local 
communities into resource decisions. As a matter of right, international 
human rights and human development theories recognize that tribes 
have a right to engage in self-government and self-determination.225 
While the Alaska Constitution’s text endorses local governance,226 
its practices do not. For Alaska’s practices to accord with its principles, 
state support must be accorded to rural governments, including tribal 
governments, to the same degree as in urban communities. Such support 
 
 224. Heather Kendall-Miller, State of Alaska v. Native Village of Tanana: 
Enhancing Tribal Power by Affirming Concurrent Tribal Jurisdiction to Initiate ICWA-
Defined Child Custody Proceedings, Both Inside and Outside of Indian Country, 28 
ALASKA L. REV. 217, 219 (2011). 
 225. Self Determination (International Law), LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE, 
http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/self_determination_international_law (last 
visited Sept. 11, 2014). 
 226. See ALASKA CONST. art. X, § 1 (“The purpose of this article is to provide 
for maximum local self-government . . . .”). 
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would enhance the capacity of tribal governments to adopt policies that 
promote human development and fate control. 
Taken together, these points illustrate the connections between 
land, governance, and wellbeing. Understanding these connections is 
necessary for the creation of public policies that properly support tribal 
communities. Land is vital to governance, but governance must move 
beyond territoriality as a defining aspect of capacity. Governance 
frameworks that integrate multiple layers of governments, local, 
statewide, regional, and international, will be vital to ensuring the 
adoption of public policies that respond to the extraordinary changes 
local communities throughout Alaska’s Arctic will face in the future. 
These frameworks, however, must integrate tribes as governments, not 
mere stakeholders, to ensure that tribes have the right to engage in self-
determination and the capacity to guide the fates and futures of their 
communities. 
